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THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOCTRINE IN

ENTUCKY

The purpose of this note is to examine the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine as it has been used and applied in Kentucky This doctrine
was summarized by the Court of Appeals in a recent case as
follows:
"Where an instrument which causes an injury is
shown to be under the control of the defendant, and
the accident is such as would not happen in the ordinary course of events if those having control of the
instrument used the degree of care imposed upon them
by law, proof of the happening of the accident, in itself, affords reasonable evidence that the accident occurred as the result of negligence on the part of the
defendant, unless the latter shows it to be attributable
to some other cause."'
The doctrine has been applied where a passenger was injured
while riding in a carrier, where several soft drink bottles exploded
or where such a bottle contained foreign matter,' where an automobile ran into a stationary object,5 where a boy was hit by a baseball
coming over the fence of a ballpark,' where chewing tobacco contained a worm,' and in other similar situations covered by the definition where "the thing speaks for itself."
Res ipsa loquitur is a type of circumstantial evidence used in
proving negligence, but it is applied m a type of situation where
ordinary circumstantial evidence could not make a case. Pound, J.
said:
"The term 'surrounding circumstances' in this connection (with the rule res ipsa loquitur) refers not to circumstances directly tending to show lack of care in
handling
but only to mere neutral circumstances of
control and management by the defendant, which may,
when explained, appear to be entirely consistent with
due care. '
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine has grown and expanded because
frequently in this mechanized age the plaintiff can do no more than
point to the injuring instrumentality, the defendant's control of it,
'Alford v. Bealrd, 301 Ky. 512, 514, 192 S.W 2d 180, 181 (1945).
'Watson v. Pullman Co., 238 Ky. 491, 38 S.W 2d 430 (1931).
5
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W 778
(1926).
"Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shelbyville v Creech, 245 Ky 414, 53
S.W 2d 745 (1932).
Schechter v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W 2d 690 (1947)
6Louisville Baseball Club v. Hill, 291 Ky 333, 164 S.W 2d 398
(1942).
7Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v Rankin, 246 Ky. 65, 54 S.W 2d
612 (1932).
8 Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. Co., 233 N.Y. 285, -, 135 N.E.
504, 505 (1922).
L.J.-9
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and the injury itself. Because of the nature of the accident no other
evidence may be available to him, while at the same time the evidence is more easily accessible to the defendant. Under these circumstances it seems reasonable for the defendant either to explain
the accident or take the risk that the jury may infer negligence on
his part. This is the reasoning behind the doctrine.
ELEMENTS
1. Control by the Defendant. The instrumentality which
causes the injury should be in the exclusive control of the defend0
ant,"
but the type of control required varies with the instrumentality
involved and the surrounding circumstances. The first res ipsa cases
involved carriers 1 and consequently there was actual physical control present, but this element was later found where the instrumentality was no longer in the hands of the defendant, such as food or
drink containers that are sealed by the defendant and later explode,"
or are found to contain foreign matter." In this type of case the defendant either was in control or should have been in control when
the negligent act was performed, and the plaintiff is able to show
that the container has not been opened by anyone else."
2. Unusual Occurrence. Negligence will not be presumed from
the mere fact of injury"--the accident must be such as would not
ordinarily happen without negligence. However, one of the circumstances to be considered is the degree of care required of the defendant. In brief, all that is required is that the balance of probabilities tends to indicate negligence. But some cases have used more
restrictive language, a typical remark being, "
the doctrine is only
to be applied when the nature of the accident itself not only clearly
supports the inference of negligence, but excludes all others, or such
as might have been due to one of several causes, of or for which
the defendant is not responsible."" However, this language was used
in a case involving the explosion of a beer keg and there was no
record of any previous injury of this kind. In other cases in' which
Norfolk & W Ry Co. v McKenzie, 116 F 2d 632 (C.C.A. 6th
1941)
" Stephens v Kitchen Lumber Co., 222 Ky 736, 2 S.W 2d 374
(1928)
Kentucky Utilities Co. v Sutton's Adm'r, 237 Ky. 732, 36
S.W 2d 380 (1931)
"lMorgan v Chesapeake & 0. Ry Co., 127 Ky 433, 32 Ky. L.
Rep. 330, 105 S.W 961 (1907)
"2Coca-Cola Bottling Works v Shelton, supra note 3.
" Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shelbyville v. Creech, supra note 4.
"Seals v Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 297 Ky 450, 179 S.W 2d
598 (1944) Note, 23 Ky. L. J. 534 (1935).
'Johnson Adm'x v. Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 178 Ky. 108, 198
S.W 538 (1917)
"Black Mountain Corp. v Partin's Adm'r, 243 Ky. 791, 49 S.W
2d 1014 (1932)
' Frank Fehr Brewing Co. v Corley, 265 Ky. 308, 317, 96 S.W
2d 860, 865 (1936).

STUDENT NOTES AND COMMEINTS
the defendant has pleaded another cause not within his control, the
court has said that a jury question is presented." The fact that the
accident might have been caused by several factors will not prevent
the application of the doctrine if the defendant has had control of all
of those factors."
Recovery has been denied where one bottle of Coca-Cola exploded ' and granted where twenty-seven exploded, the court saying,
"From these facts it may be inferred that they were defective or
were improperly charged, matters exclusively under the control of
the defendant, and presumably within its knowledge, and that when
delivered their condition was such as to render them imminently if
not intrinsically dangerous." ' The manufacturer of plug chewing
tobacco has been held liable to a consumer who purchased a plug
from a retailer and was poisoned through biting into a worm pressed
into the plug during its manufacture."
Kentucky has held many times that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to malpractice cases." It has been said, "
the mere failure
to effect a cure does not raise the presumption of want of proper
care, skill, and diligence upon the part of a physician
"I The most
freauently used reasoning for this position was enunciated by Taft,
J. in Ewing v. Goode."
"A physician is not a warranter of cures. If the
maxim 'Res Ipsa Loquitur' were applicable to a case
like this, and a failure to cure were held to be evidence, however slight, of negligence on the part of the
physician or surgeon causing the bad result, few would
be courageous enough to practice the healing art, for
they would have to assume financial liability for nearly
all the 'ills that flesh is hei to'""
"Reibert v Thompson, 302 Ky 688, 194 S.W 2d 974 (1946)
Schechter v. Hann, supra note 5.
"Ralston v Dossey, 289 Ky. 40, 157 S.W 2d 739 (1941).
'Loebig's Guardian v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124, 81
S.W 2d 910 (1935).
" Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky 118, 122, 282
S.W 778, 780 (1926).
-Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, supra note 7.
"Steinmetz v. Humphrey, 289 Ky. 709, 160 S.W 2d 6 (1942),
Williams v. Tartar, 286 Ky. 717, 151 S.W 2d 783 (1941) Meador v
Arnold, 264 Ky. 378, 94 S.W 2d 626 (1936)
Hazard Hospital Co.
v. Combs, 263 Ky. 252, 92 S.W 2d 35 (1936), Prewitt v. Higgins, 231
Ky. 678, 22 S.W 2d 115 (1929), Donoho v Rawleigh, 230 Ky 11, 18
S.W 2d 311 (1929) Hanners v Salmon, 216 Ky. 584, 288 S.W 307
(1926) Miller v. Blackburn, 170 Ky 263, 185 S.W 864 (1916) Barnett's Adm'r v. Brand, 165 Ky 616, 177 S.W 461 (1915).
"Miller v. Blackburn, 170 Ky. 263, 270, 185 S.W 864, 867 (1916).
78 Fed. 442 (S. D. Ohio 1897) quoted in Miller v. Blackburn,
supra note 24.
' Id. at 443. But a physician may be sued in his proprietary
capacity as owner of a hospital: Quillon v Skaggs, 233 Ky 171, 25
S.W 2d 33 (1930).
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But despite the number of Kentucky decisions saying that res ipsa
loquitur is not applicable to malpractice cases tins position seems
logically indefensible, and upon examination the decisions appear to
be based on other groundsY'
Examination of the cases show that they rest on at least three
other grounds:
(1)
An improper result or a failure to cure, of itself, is no evidence of negligence: Steinmetz v Humphrey, Williams v. Tartar,
Meador v. Arnold, Prewitt v Higgins, Donoho v Rawleigh, Hanners
v. Salmon, Miller v Blackburn, supra note 23. This is beside the
point, for it is saying no more than that the mury itself is no evidence of negligence. This has always been a limitation imposed upon
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
(2)
The negligence was not the proximate cause of the in3ury:
Hazard Hospital Co. v Combs, Barnett's Adm'r v Brand, supra note
23. Since this is a limitation common to all negligence actions it
would not tend to prove that res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable to malpractice cases, but rather that there was no cause of action at all.
(3)
Expert testimony would be needed to prove negligence:
Meador v Arnold, supra note 23. Since res ipsa loquitur is not applied unless the balance of probabilities point to negligence according to the common knowledge of ordinary laymen, this limitation
does not preclude the application of the doctrine.
In short, the identical grounds upon which these cases demed
recovery are implicit in a discriminating enumeration of the requirements for a good res ipsa case.
Do these limitations, which are a part of the doctrmne itself, by
necessity exclude all malpractice cases? In Samuels v. Willis, 133 Ky.
459, 118 S.W 339 (1909) where a surgical sponge was left in the
abdomen of a patient, thus making another operation necessary, the
court allowed a recovery although res ipsa loquitur was not specifically mentioned. In a later res ipsa case (Steinmetz v. Humphrey,
supra note 23) Samuels v Willis was referred to and the court said
that the leaving of a sponge in a patient was negligence within the
common knowledge of the ordinary layman, unless explained by the
defendant.
Hence we come to the position either that the leaving of a surgical sponge in a patient is an exception to the rule that res ipsa loqultur will not apply to a malpractice case, or else we must admit that
the application of the doctrine itself would have denied recovery as
in the other cases. It is submitted that the latter is the better view.
A recent California case succinctly stated the argument in favor
of the application of the doctrine where a patient received an injury
that paralyzed his arm while undergoing an appendectomy, "The
present case is of a type which comes within the reason and spirit
of the doctrine more fully perhaps than any other. The passenger
sitting awake in a railway car at the time of a collision, the pedestrian walking along the street and struck by a falling object or the
debris of an explosion, are surely not more entitled to an explanation than the unconscious patient on the operating table." (Ybarra
v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 F 2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1265 [1944). )
The point of this discussion is not that niceties of language have
been overlooked, but that there are situations where res ipsa loquitur
could well apply to malpractice cases in this jurisdiction-cases in
which the plaintiff could have no other remedy, and where the
rights of the medical profession would be adequately protected by a
just application of the doctrine. For the method of handling in other
jurisdictions, see Note, 162 A.L.R. 1265 (1946).
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3. Plaintiff not at fault. In order to recover the plaintiff must
have been free from fault, but the type of contributory fault that
will prevent the plaintiff from recovering is not so essentially different from that involved in the usual negligence case as to merit discussion here except in those cases between employer and employee.
In such cases the employee may be in control himself and hence cannot recover,' or else may have been injured by the negligence of a
fellow servant. These possibilities have led the courts to say that
something more is required when the employee seeks to invoke the
rule res ipsa loquitur against his employer. = However, this does not
seem justifiable if the plaintiff can prove that he was not in control
and can eliminate the negligence of a fellow servant or intermeddler'
4. Defendant's superior access to the eidence. Some decisions
include the added element that the defendant's knowledge or access
to the evidence must be superior to that of the plaintiff." Certainly
this is true in the sense that if all the facts are known and testified
to at the trial there will be no need for the application of the doctrine
as the negligence may be proved directly.
But to use this as an
added element seems more of a makeweightf or rationalization as
the defendant's superior knowledge would seem a necessary concomitant of his exclusive control.
EFFECT
Much has been written concerning whether res ipsa loquitur
raises a presumption or inference, and the question becomes even
more confused because of the varying effects that are given to presumptions, presumption of fact sometimes being used interchangeably with inference. The crux of the problem, divested of confusing
terms, is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict if the
defendant introduces no evidence. At one time there were two lines
of decisions within tis jurisdiction: one holding that the burden of
proof shifted to the defendant,' and the other holding that a res ipsa
case merely permitted the jury to infer negligence."
- Stephens v. Kitchen Lumber Co., supra note 10.
2 High Splint Coal Co. v Bailey's Adm'r, 238 Ky. 217, 37 S.W

2d 22 (1931).
"Note, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1221.
:"Paducah Traction Co. v. Baker, 130 Ky. 360, 113 S.W

449

<1908)
•2Droppelman v. Willingham, 293 Ky 614, 169 S.W 2d 811
(1943).
PROSSER, TORTS 303 (1941).
T. B. Jones & Co. v. Pelly, 128 S.W 305 (Ky. 1910) L. &
N. R. Co. v. Comley, 173 Ky. 469, 191 'S.W 96 (1917), Quillon v
Skaggs, supra note 26.
SWatson v. Pullman Co., 238 Ky. 491, 38 S.W 2d 430 (1931)
Wright v Elkhorn Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., 182 Ky. 423, 206
S.W 634 (1908).
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In Black Mountain Corporationv. Partin'sAdm'r the court referred to the confusion and said that it favored the latter view, as a
res ipsa case presented facts "
from which the jury may infer
negligence on the part of the one charged therewith, and that from
that point he shall 'go forward' with his proof in substantiation of
the exercise of the proper degree of care on his part."'
In brief, the presentation of a res ipsa case merely discharges
the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to get by the
judge and the jury, but it does not entitle him to a directed verdict.
This seems the better view and has been followed in the later cases.,
Certainly Kentucky is not using the presumptive effect as it is defined in the Model Code of Evidence:
"
when the basic fact of a presumption has been established in an action, the existence of the presumed
fact must be assumed unless and until the evidence has
been introduced which would support a finding of its
non-existence or the basic fact of an inconsistent presumption has been established." *
An allied problem which arises less frequently is as to the effect
to be given to a res ipsa case when the defendant introduces evidence. Again there has been no little confusion. If the defendant's
evidence shows that he used the proper degree of care, and the plaintiff cannot contradict that evidence directly should a verdict be
directed for the defendant? Or may the jury still infer negligence?
The latter view would seem preferable, since this is the very type
of situation which the doctrine was evolved to meet. Consider the
position of the plaintiff who was made ill by drinking part of a soft
drink that contained a partially decomposed mouse."0 All that the
plaintiff can do is to trace the course of purchase to the defendant,
point to the mouse in the bottle, and show his medical expenses,
while the defendant can show the most scrupulous care. In such a
situation the res ipsa case should be weighed as evidence and the
question decided by the jury Kentucky has espoused this view."
However, the inference of defendant's negligence disappears on
a conclusive showing of defendant's exercise of the appropriate degree of care. "But
the overcoming proof
must be undisputed
and uncontradicted by any testimony or circumstances refuting it.'""
(Latter emphasis writer's.) Obviously, so long as the circumstances
still have weight even after the defendant has introduced testimony,
"Supra note 16.
7
Black Mountain Corp. v -Partin's Adm'r, 243 Ky 791, 797, 49
S.W 2d 1014, 1017 (1932)
Droppelman v Willingham, supra note 32.
" MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 704, sec. 1 (1942).
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Creech, supra note 4.
"Ibid., Coca-Cola Bottling Works v Curtis, 302 Ky. 199, 194
S.W 2d 375 (1946)
12 New St. L.
& Calhoun Pack Corporation v Pennsylvama R.
Co., 302 Ky. 693, 703, 194 S.W 2d 977, 982 (1946).
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the actual effect of a res ipsa case in this jurisdiction is to allow a
permissible inference, regardless of what terminology may be used.
It is submitted that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine as evolved
and applied in this state is in the main internally consistent, in accord with the majority holdings, and consonant with the preferred
views of the writers.
FRED H. DAUGHERTY

